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Article

Corporate Governance Structure and Corporate Financial Performance: A Research Proposal Based on Chinese Listed Companies

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Abstract: This research proposal investigates the relationship between corporate governance structure and corporate financial performance among Chinese listed companies, utilizing the 2012 China Securities Regulatory Commission industry classification framework. The study concentrates on three critical governance dimensions: limited board autonomy, chief executive officer duality, and concentrated majority shareholder control, with particular emphasis on state-owned shareholding. A comprehensive review of existing literature reveals that while prior studies have recognized these governance challenges, they frequently suffer from imprecise conceptual definitions, insufficient causal explanations, and a lack of rigorous firm-level empirical investigation. To address these gaps, four hypotheses are formulated. First, a lower proportion of autonomous directors on the board is anticipated to exert a negative influence on firm performance. Second, chief executive officer duality is hypothesized to produce ambiguous effects, potentially enhancing performance through centralized decision-making authority or diminishing it by weakening board-level oversight mechanisms. Third, concentrated majority shareholder control is expected to adversely affect corporate financial outcomes. Methodologically, a multivariate regression framework is proposed, with operating income serving as the dependent variable and the identified governance factors functioning as explanatory variables. Empirical data are sourced from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database, and preliminary descriptive statistics are presented for key variables. The study establishes a foundational analytical framework to guide subsequent empirical investigation rather than offering definitive causal conclusions.

Keywords: corporate governance; financial performance; board structure; state ownership; listed companies

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1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose and Significance of the Research

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance structure issues and corporate financial performance in Chinese listed companies across industries, as classified under the 2012 industry classification standard issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission [1].

Corporate governance structure constitutes a key organizational framework within the modern enterprise system [2]. In its narrow definition, it pertains to the allocation and equilibrium of authority among shareholders, the board of directors, and senior management. In its broader conception, it encompasses the interactions between the enterprise and its stakeholders—including employees, customers, lessors, and creditors—

facilitating the establishment of corporate objectives, the formulation of implementation strategies, and the maintenance of effective oversight through appropriate institutional mechanisms.

An effective governance structure motivates directors and managers to advance the long-term interests of the enterprise and sustain its stable operations. Conversely, insufficient incentive mechanisms and oversight mechanisms may lead directors and managers to fall short in safeguarding enterprise and shareholder interests, thereby impairing operational efficiency and financial outcomes [3].

The failure of a major U.S. energy company in 2001 serves as an illustrative case of severe corporate governance breakdown. Once widely recognized for its business model innovation, the company experienced a comprehensive loss of value and eroded substantial economic resources. This episode underscores that robust corporate governance is essential not only for enterprise resilience but also for the orderly functioning of capital markets [4].

Research on Chinese listed companies holds both theoretical and practical relevance. As a leading global trading nation, China's economic development is increasingly integrated with the world economy. Within this context of deepening global economic interdependence, understanding how governance structures influence firm performance can assist Chinese listed enterprises in identifying and mitigating adverse impacts arising from governance shortcomings, thereby supporting sustainable corporate growth and macroeconomic stability.

1.2. Corporate Governance Problems in Chinese Listed Companies

1.2.1. State Ownership and Majority Shareholder Control

The ownership structures of many Chinese listed companies reflect the historical development of state-owned enterprises [5]. During the early phase of shareholding system establishment, priority was given to supporting the listing of state-owned enterprises while safeguarding state assets and maintaining domestic market stability. As a result, the state retained controlling or majority shareholding positions in numerous listed companies.

This concentrated ownership structure, shaped by institutional arrangements, may give rise to governance challenges. Directors and senior management in key positions may face insufficient performance incentives and oversight mechanisms, potentially compromising corporate interests and operational efficiency. The substantial presence of state-held shares may also limit the influence of other shareholders, hindering effective protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders [6]. Consequently, the level of state shareholding may correlate with corporate financial outcomes.

1.2.2. CEO Duality

CEO duality refers to an arrangement in which the chief executive officer also serves as the chair of the board of directors [1]. This structure is observed in certain Chinese listed companies and may result in an elevated degree of authority consolidation within corporate governance.

When the CEO holds both roles, they effectively take part in assessing their own managerial performance, potentially compromising the independence and objectivity of board oversight. To present outcomes more favorably, the CEO may supply incomplete or biased information to the board, thereby influencing approval decisions and advancing personal interests [7]. Such dual leadership may therefore diminish supervisory effectiveness and adversely impact corporate financial outcomes.

1.2.3. Weak Board Independence and Insider Control

Another governance issue is the relatively high proportion of internal directors on the boards of some Chinese listed companies. A representative sampling survey indicated that, although the share of internal directors has gradually decreased, they still constitute over half of board membership [8].

On boards where executive directors hold a majority, lower-ranking directors may face challenges in exercising oversight over the chairperson and general manager. Due to their reporting relationships with senior management, they may defer to decisions made by superiors to align with their own career or compensation interests. Consequently, board functions may become largely procedural, limiting effective oversight of corporate leadership. This dynamic may lead to decision-making that emphasizes individual managerial interests rather than overall corporate objectives. Board composition structure and the concentration of leadership roles may therefore influence corporate financial outcomes [7].

Studying these governance features is important because some stem from China's unique historical evolution and institutional development path. State ownership played a key role in supporting national economic stability and rapid growth during earlier stages of reform; however, evolving market conditions now call for refined governance mechanisms [4]. Analyzing how state ownership, leadership role consolidation, board composition, and financial performance interrelate can inform practical improvements in corporate governance effectiveness.

1.3. Research Aim

This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance structure characteristics and corporate financial performance in Chinese listed companies [6]. It focuses on three aspects discussed above: state-owned shareholding, CEO duality, and board composition. By examining these relationships, the study seeks to determine whether variations in these governance features are associated with differences in firm performance.

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

2.1. Review of Existing Studies

Existing studies identify several governance characteristics in Chinese listed companies, including alignment between shareholder and management interests, predominant state participation in ownership, combined roles of chief executive and board chair, internal dominance in decision-making, and limited external oversight capacity of boards. One study discusses shareholder rights, relationships between shareholders and the board, state participation in ownership, combined leadership roles, and reduced external oversight capacity arising from internal dominance. These features may present challenges when managerial priorities diverge from broader stakeholder objectives. If such misalignments persist, companies may experience reduced investor engagement, operational volatility, or financial distress [3]. A notable contribution of this work is its grounding in the legal framework governing corporate operations in China, clarifying how statutory provisions shape the scope and exercise of shareholder rights. However, the concepts of combined leadership roles and internal dominance are treated jointly without precise conceptual boundaries, limiting clarity on their distinct influences on board functions and organizational outcomes. Another study examines governance mechanisms, board composition, ownership patterns, and financial outcomes in Chinese listed companies. Its key insight concerns the functional role of external directors: it observes that directors lacking sufficient access to operational information may face constraints in fully understanding corporate activities, thereby helping explain why formal external appointment does not always translate into effective oversight. Yet the study does not specify criteria for selecting such directors, nor does it delineate their responsibilities relative to internal personnel. A further study analyzes internal dominance, limited external oversight capacity, combined leadership roles, and extensive government involvement in ownership. It notes that when government entities hold controlling stakes, governance arrangements may affect the interests of non-controlling stakeholders. Supporting firm-level evidence indicates that incentive structures for executives tend to be less responsive in government-influenced and highly concentrated firms, while a greater presence of external directors correlates with stronger linkage between executive compensation and firm performance. Nevertheless, definitions of internal dominance and combined leadership roles remain unspecified, and the mechanisms through which combined leadership roles influence board effectiveness are not fully elaborated.

Overall, the reviewed studies highlight majority ownership concentration, combined leadership roles, internal dominance, and constrained external oversight capacity as recurring governance features. Related research also suggests that corporate transparency practices and internal control systems may influence information transparency and trading behavior by insiders [9]. However, such evidence focuses on disclosure quality and insider trading rather than directly evaluating the governance features under investigation here. More precise conceptual definitions and more integrated analyses of the origins and organizational implications of these governance features are therefore still needed.

2.2. Strengths, Limitations, and Research Gaps

The reviewed studies provide a theoretical basis for understanding corporate governance in China. Key aspects such as shareholder rights and alignment between ownership and management have been explored. Governance mechanisms, board composition, and financial performance have also been examined, while the influence of administrative oversight on enterprise operations has been noted [10].

Three main limitations remain [11]. First, important concepts such as dual leadership roles, internal dominance in decision-making, and director selection criteria are not consistently defined. Second, the linkages among governance arrangements—particularly how dual leadership roles relate to board composition and oversight effectiveness—are insufficiently clarified. Third, the structural foundations and operational implications of concentrated shareholding warrant deeper investigation.

The most important research gap is the lack of empirical analysis linking governance structure features to firm performance. Existing studies primarily offer conceptual insights but are limited by insufficient company-level data and quantitative modeling approaches [12]. Table 1 summarizes their main contributions and limitations.

Table 1. Summary of Previous Studies and Research Gaps

Study	Main Governance Issues	Contribution Identified in the Paper	Relevance or Limitation
Shan and Round (2012)	Shareholder rights, state ownership, CEO duality, and insider control	Identifies common governance problems in Chinese listed companies	Does not clearly distinguish CEO duality from insider control
Shan and McIver (2011)	Governance mechanisms, ownership structure, board independence, and financial performance	Provides company-level evidence from Chinese listed non-financial firms	Requires clearer explanation of how individual mechanisms operate
Wei and Geng (2008)	State ownership, insider control, CEO duality, and	Highlights ownership concentration and	Provides limited explanation of

	board independence	government control	some governance mechanisms
Conyon and He (2011)	State control, ownership concentration, independent directors, and executive incentives	Connects board governance and ownership structure with executive incentives and firm performance	Focuses primarily on executive compensation
Lu et al. (2018)	Information disclosure, internal control, and insider trading	Shows the relevance of disclosure and internal control to information asymmetry	Does not directly test the governance variables in this study
Overall literature	Governance structure and firm performance	Provides theoretical and empirical foundations	Does not consistently examine all three governance factors within one model

As shown in Table 1, the reviewed literature covers ownership structure, board composition, executive incentives, internal decision-making patterns, and information transparency. However, these studies address different governance dimensions and do not consistently examine director representation, dual leadership roles, and state-affiliated shareholding within a unified analytical framework [13].

2.3. Independent Directors and Firm Performance

An external director is a board member who maintains no material financial ties or business relationships with the company, its controlling shareholders, senior management, or affiliated entities, apart from standard director compensation. External directors are typically non-employee professionals drawn from outside the organization and do not participate in day-to-day operational activities. Their appointment aims to enhance governance effectiveness and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders. This function becomes especially relevant under ownership structures where shareholding is either widely dispersed or highly concentrated [14]. By occupying key board roles, external directors contribute to balanced decision-making processes. Their oversight capacity relies on objective judgment and professional competence. To ensure impartiality, external directors should not hold internal management positions or maintain close personal, familial, or economic connections with the company or its personnel, enabling them to assess corporate governance matters objectively.

Internal staff may face inherent limitations in supervising senior executives due to organizational dependency and alignment of career and financial interests with company outcomes. In contrast, external directors can reinforce board-level oversight. Empirical findings from Chinese listed companies indicate that a higher proportion of external directors correlates with stronger alignment between executive compensation and firm performance, as well as increased likelihood of leadership adjustment following sustained underperformance. Additional firm-level evidence from China suggests that greater external representation on boards is associated with improved operational efficiency—particularly in state-influenced enterprises—and contributes to more disciplined capital allocation and reduced conflicts of interest in related-party transactions [15]. Therefore, insufficient external director representation may impair the board's capacity to monitor management effectively and uphold shareholder rights.

H1: Insufficient external director representation negatively affects firm performance.

2.4. CEO Duality and Firm Performance

CEO duality refers to the arrangement where the chief executive officer also serves as chair of the board. This governance structure has been associated with both potential benefits and drawbacks for firm performance.

2.4.1. Positive Effect

CEO duality may create a unified decision-making center. Concentrating leadership authority in one person can reduce internal disagreement and improve decision-making efficiency [16]. It may also allow the CEO to respond more quickly to external events and maintain normal corporate operations under changing conditions. Empirical evidence from Chinese listed firms during periods of institutional transition supports the view that CEO duality can enhance performance through unity of command, though its effectiveness may vary with organizational and environmental contexts.

H2: CEO duality has a positive effect on firm performance.

2.4.2. Negative Effect

CEO duality may lead to excessive concentration of managerial and supervisory authority. When the CEO also serves as board chair, self-evaluation becomes inevitable, undermining the objectivity and effectiveness of board oversight [17]. The CEO may present misleading, incomplete, or selectively disclosed information to secure board approval and advance personal interests. Managers may engage in opportunistic behavior, prioritizing private gains over shareholder value.

Separating the CEO and board chair roles strengthens independent oversight, enabling the chair to monitor executive conduct more effectively and better align managerial actions with shareholder interests. Combined leadership inherently weakens this supervisory mechanism [6]. Empirical evidence from longitudinal comparisons of board leadership structures indicates that firms adopting independent board leadership consistently demonstrate superior performance across multiple financial and governance metrics.

H3: CEO duality has a negative effect on firm performance.

H2 and H3 capture the dual implications identified in prior research: while CEO duality may enhance decision-making speed and coherence, it simultaneously risks diluting board oversight and encouraging managerial opportunism [13].

2.5. Majority Shareholder Control and Firm Performance

Majority shareholder control in Chinese listed companies is closely linked to the evolution of state-owned enterprises and the central role of controlling shareholders in corporate governance.

First, regulatory frameworks governing the establishment of joint-stock companies facilitated streamlined incorporation processes for state-owned entities, contributing to ownership structures characterized by strong controlling stakes. This structural feature has enabled continued strategic oversight by state-affiliated entities [7, 16]. The institutional presence of the state is further evident in the management and personnel arrangements of centrally administered enterprises. However, certain analyses emphasize leadership transitions within administrative systems rather than ownership structure or operational outcomes, and thus serve only to contextualize the broader institutional environment.

Second, decision-making aligned with shareholding weight may amplify the influence of controlling shareholders [13]. Their positions often shape formal corporate resolutions, which apply uniformly across all shareholders. Ownership structure also correlates with financial policy choices. Empirical evidence indicates that state affiliation and the equity stake held by the largest shareholder are key determinants of capital structure decisions among Chinese firms. While such studies do not address votingrelated governance mechanisms, they affirm the significance of ownership distribution patterns.

From a law-and-finance perspective, robust director accountability mechanisms and enforceable investor safeguards help mitigate potential risks to stakeholders. Although this principle is derived from cross-national experience, it underscores the universal relevance of protective governance infrastructure. Related research on investor safeguards in emerging digital asset markets highlights comparable concerns about regulatory effectiveness. Given the distinct market context, such findings serve only to reinforce the general importance of credible, implementable protections [8].

When corporate decision-making is predominantly guided by controlling shareholders, participation opportunities for other shareholders may be constrained, and shareholder meetings may function primarily as procedural formalities. Such dynamics can reduce engagement breadth and potentially impair firm performance.

H4: Majority shareholder control has a negative effect on firm performance.

2.6. Summary of Research Hypotheses

The preceding discussion develops four hypotheses concerning independent director representation, CEO duality, majority shareholder control, and firm performance. Table 2 summarizes the governance factor and proposed relationship associated with each hypothesis.

Table 2. Summary of Research Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Governance Factor	Proposed Relationship with Firm Performance
H1	Weak independent director representation	Negative
H2	CEO duality	Positive
H3	CEO duality	Negative
H4	Majority shareholder control	Negative

As shown in Table 2, H1 predicts that weak independent director representation negatively affects firm performance. H2 and H3 reflect the competing effects of CEO duality, while H4 predicts a negative effect of majority shareholder control [3, 10].

2.7. Conceptual Framework

Figure 1 summarizes the relationships derived from the literature review. Independent director representation, CEO duality, and majority shareholder control—or state-owned shareholding—are identified as the principal governance factors associated with corporate financial performance. Operating income serves as the measure of firm performance in the subsequent research design [12, 14]. As shown in Figure 1, the study examines the relationships among these three governance factors and corporate financial performance. No mediating, moderating, or control variables are incorporated, as they are not part of the original research design.



Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of the Research

3. Research Methods and Preliminary Data

3.1. Research Design

This study adopts a quantitative research design to examine the relationship between corporate governance structure problems and corporate financial performance. Multiple regression analysis is employed to assess whether selected governance variables are associated with firm performance. A more specialized sparse multivariate regression framework with covariance estimation has been developed in prior methodological work; however, the present study relies solely on the general regression principle of relating response variables to explanatory variables and does not implement such advanced estimation procedures.

Corporate financial performance serves as the dependent variable, while identified corporate governance problems serve as explanatory variables. Operating income is used as the indicator of firm performance. Governance variables include the proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, and the proportion of state-owned shares [6]. At this stage, part of the required data has been collected and processed, and preliminary descriptive statistics have been conducted. The regression model has not yet been estimated, and no hypothesis-testing results are reported in this section.

3.2. Data Source and Collected Data

The research focuses on a sample of Chinese listed companies across multiple industries, classified according to the 2012 industry classification standard issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission [3]. All empirical data are drawn from the CSMAR database.

The dataset includes operating income, the proportion of independent directors on the board, and the proportion of state-owned shares in total share capital. The original observations span January 2009 to December 2010. CEO duality is incorporated into the theoretical framework and research hypotheses; however, company-level descriptive statistics for this variable are not reported separately in the current dataset.

3.3. Variable Definitions

Table 3 defines the variables included in the analysis. Operating income serves as the primary indicator of corporate financial performance, while the remaining variables reflect dimensions of corporate governance structure examined in prior sections.

Table 3. Definitions and Measurement of Main Variables

Variable	Role	Definition or Measurement	Source

Operating income	Dependent variable	Operating income reported by the listed company and used to reflect firm performance	CSMAR
Independent director ratio	Explanatory variable	Proportion of independent directors on the board of directors	CSMAR
CEO duality	Explanatory variable	Whether the chief executive officer simultaneously serves as board chair	Not separately reported in the current descriptive statistics
State-owned share ratio	Explanatory variable	Proportion of state-owned shares in total shares	CSMAR

As shown in Table 3, three governance variables are incorporated into the analysis. Descriptive statistics currently report values only for the independent director ratio and state-owned share ratio; CEO duality data must be finalized prior to estimating the full regression model.

3.4. Proposed Regression Analysis

Based on a general multiple-regression structure, the proposed relationship can be expressed as:

$$\text{Operating Income}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Independent Director Ratio}_i + \beta_2 \text{CEO Duality}_i + \beta_3 \text{State-Owned Share Ratio}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where $\text{Operating Income}_i$ represents the financial performance of company i; $\text{Independent Director Ratio}_i$ represents the proportion of independent directors on its board; CEO Duality_i indicates whether the CEO also serves as board chair; and $\text{State-Owned Share Ratio}_i$ represents the proportion of state-owned shares in total shares. The coefficients β_1, β_2, and β_3 represent the relationships between the governance variables and operating income, while ε_i represents the error term [5]. A more specialized sparse multivariate regression framework with covariance estimation has been developed in prior methodological work. The present study adopts only the general regression principle of relating a dependent variable to several explanatory variables and does not implement that advanced estimation procedure. This equation therefore represents a proposed model rather than an estimated regression.

This equation organizes the relationships proposed in the literature review. It is a proposed model rather than an estimated regression, because the current document does not report regression coefficients, significance levels, or hypothesis-testing results.

3.5. Descriptive Statistics

Preliminary descriptive statistics were calculated for operating income, the independent director ratio, and the state-owned share ratio. Table 4 presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis for each variable.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of the Collected Variables

Variable	Observations	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Skewness	Kurtosis
Operating income	171	5,430,536,143	1,509,729,400	15,488,828,129	14,179,700	148,337,000,000	6.9105	55.3822
Independent director ratio	32	0.3622	0.3333	0.0383	0.3333	0.4444	1.0655	−0.2733
State-owned share ratio	238	0.1455	0	0.2267	0	0.8400	1.4214	0.7994

As shown in Table 4, operating income has a mean of approximately 5.43 billion and a median of approximately 1.51 billion. Its skewness of 6.9105 and kurtosis of 55.3822 indicate a strongly right-skewed distribution, with a small number of companies reporting substantially higher operating income than most others in the sample [11].

The independent director ratio has a mean of 0.3622 and a median of 0.3333, indicating that the proportion is generally clustered near one-third of board membership. Its values range from 0.3333 to 0.4444 across the 32 available observations [2].

The state-owned share ratio has a mean of 0.1455, while both its median and mode are zero. This reflects that many observations report no state-owned shares, although the maximum proportion reaches 0.8400. Its positive skewness of 1.4214 aligns with a predominance of low values and a smaller number of firms with relatively high state ownership.

The numbers of observations differ substantially across the three variables: 171 for operating income, 32 for the independent director ratio, and 238 for the state-owned share ratio. These datasets therefore require alignment by company and observation period before joint inclusion in the proposed regression analysis [3]. The descriptive statistics serve only as an initial summary of the collected data and do not test or support any research hypotheses.

4. Conclusion

4.1. Summary of the Existing Research Content

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance structure characteristics and corporate financial performance in Chinese listed companies. It focuses on three governance features discussed in the preceding chapters: board composition with limited external representation, the combination of chief executive and chair roles, and majority shareholder influence, particularly the substantial presence of state-owned shares. The literature review indicates that prior work has identified these features and linked them to shareholder engagement, board oversight functions, and strategic decision-making processes. However, the reviewed studies often lack precise conceptual definitions and comprehensive analysis of underlying drivers and implications. More importantly, much of the existing discussion remains conceptual and does not incorporate robust empirical validation using firm-level data or regression modeling.

Based on the literature review, four hypotheses are proposed. A lower proportion of external directors is expected to negatively affect firm performance. The combination of chief executive and chair roles is considered from two competing perspectives: it may enhance performance by streamlining decision-making, but it may also impair performance by consolidating authority and reducing oversight effectiveness. Majority shareholder influence is expected to have a negative effect on firm performance.

The study proposes a multivariate regression design in which corporate financial performance is the dependent variable and the identified governance features are explanatory variables. Operating income is used to represent firm performance. The available data were collected from the CSMAR database and include operating income, the proportion of external directors, and the proportion of state-owned shares. Preliminary descriptive statistics were calculated for these three variables.

4.2. Current Research Status

The study has completed the literature review, identified principal research gaps, formulated four hypotheses, and specified a regression framework. Company-level data collection and preprocessing are partially complete, and descriptive statistics have been reported. However, the multivariate regression model remains unestimated; consequently, no regression coefficients, significance tests, or hypothesis-testing outcomes are available, and the proposed relationships lack empirical support.

4.3. Limitations and Further Work

Several limitations remain. The number of observations varies across operating income, independent director ratio, and state-owned share ratio, necessitating matching by company and fiscal period. CEO duality data are absent from the current descriptive statistics, and corporate financial performance is captured solely by operating income. Future work should harmonize the dataset, integrate CEO duality measures, and estimate the proposed regression model. Selected company cases could then be analyzed to clarify the statistical relationships and illuminate the practical implications of corporate governance structures.

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