A Kantian Analysis of the Fallibility of Moral Intuition

Abstract

This study evaluates the reliability of moral intuition in ethical reasoning, juxtaposing its spontaneous, subjective nature against the universal, rational framework of Kantian morality. Drawing on perspectives from ethical intuitionism, empirical psychology, and Kantian philosophy, it examines how moral intuitions are shaped by experience, susceptible to external influences, and prone to inconsistency. Through analyses of moral dilemmas, including the trolley problem and the impact of framing effects, the investigation highlights the variability of intuition. In contrast, Kant's categorical imperative establishes a priori, universal principles as the foundation of ethical truth, rejecting intuition as a dependable moral guide. While intuition may often align with moral outcomes, its inherent susceptibility to error undermines its credibility. Conversely, reasoned deliberations should be advocated as the path to achieving moral certainty.