Evaluating the Dependability of Intuitive Processes in Moral Judgement

Abstract

The reliability of moral intuition as a source of ethical knowledge has been a subject of significant philosophical debate, particularly regarding its limitations. These limitations arise primarily from two factors: disagreement and psychological influence. For example, the “Trolley Problem” presents a stark contrast between utilitarian and deontological perspectives, where the former advocates for the greater good for the greatest number, and the latter insists on adherence to moral rules, regardless of consequences.  This fundamental divergence in moral intuitions challenges the universality of such judgements, as what one person may feel intuitively is morally right, another might deem wrong. Furthermore, psychological influences, including cognitive biases and emotional factors, play a significant role in shaping moral intuitions often leading to inconsistent or unreliable unethical judgements even when the scenarios are fundamentally similar. Factors such as personal experiences, societal influences, and unconscious biases can skew one’s intuitive response creating discrepancies in moral decision-making that undermine the reliability of intuition as a sole guide on ethics. While moral intuition may serve as an effective tool for understanding simple, self-evident ethical principles, it often proves inadequate when confronted with complex moral dilemmas that require nuanced deliberation. In contrast, moral reasoning—through its emphasis on critical evaluation, rational analysis, and systematic reflection—provides a more dependable approach to navigating such dilemmas.