An Institutional Response to the Coal-to-Gas Dilemma in Rural Hebei from the Perspective of Ecological Protection Compensation

Abstract

Against the backdrop of joint prevention and control of air pollution in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei (BTH) region, the rural coal-to-gas (C2G) transition in Hebei has significantly improved regional atmospheric quality but has concurrently driven up heating expenditures for rural households, generating a pronounced policy trade-off between environmental sustainability and residential welfare. This structural dilemma stems from multidimensional causes: at the practical level, the gradual withdrawal of transitional gas subsidies fails to adequately offset the escalating economic burden of clean heating; at the economic level, it reflects a systemic failure to internalize the positive environmental externalities generated by upstream regions; and at the legal level, it manifests as fragmented interest coordination across administrative boundaries and insufficient institutional supply. The ecological protection compensation framework provides a robust remedial pathway, substantiated by both jurisprudential principles and administrative feasibility. Regarding institutional architecture, a formal horizontal compensation agreement must be established among the Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei provincial governments to reimburse rural Hebei residents for both direct expenditures and opportunity costs incurred during the energy transition. Furthermore, compensation benchmarks must be calibrated to ensure socioeconomic viability, with optimized gas subsidy mechanisms serving as the primary financial instrument to guarantee long-term policy sustainability and equitable regional development. This study systematically evaluates the current regulatory gaps and proposes actionable legislative reforms to harmonize ecological objectives with rural livelihood security.