Infrastructure and Co-Evolution of State Capacity: Evidence from Kyrgyz-Chinese Energy Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.70088/yfe2ng25Keywords:
infrastructure governance, state capacity, belt and road initiative, institutional alignment, energy cooperation, central asiaAbstract
This paper advances the Infrastructure-Induced State Capacity Co-evolution (ISCC) framework to theorize infrastructure governance as an endogenous driver of state capacity formation in developing economies. Mainstream approaches in political economy and development studies often treat state capacity as either a precondition for effective infrastructure delivery or a passive byproduct of capital investment. In contrast, the ISCC model identifies three recursive mechanisms—institutional alignment, risk internalization, and local technical participation—that interact dynamically to build routinized bureaucratic capacity under conditions of moderate institutional stability. Employing process tracing and a most-similar system design, we compare two Chinese-Kyrgyz energy projects: the Bishkek Thermal Power Plant (TPP), delivered as a short-term turnkey project, and the Kara-Balta Refinery, managed as a long-term joint venture. Our evidence demonstrates that project outcomes depend not on investment volume but on the quality of governance arrangements embedded within each cooperation model. Specifically, the joint venture structure fostered deeper institutional learning and sustained bureaucratic engagement, whereas the turnkey approach yielded limited capacity spillovers. This study contributes to infrastructure governance theory by clarifying how weak states can build administrative and technical capacity through cross-border project interaction, moving beyond the conventional focus on state capacity as a static prerequisite. Furthermore, it provides novel empirical insights from Central Asia, a region frequently overlooked in global development research, thereby broadening the geographical and theoretical scope of the infrastructure-state capacity debate.References
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Copyright (c) 2026 Jin Song, Asanov Rustambek Kipchakovich (Author)

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