Judicial Determination Divergences and Research Review of New Types of Hidden Corruption Crimes

Abstract

With the deepening and intensification of anti-corruption efforts in recent years, traditional forms of explicit corruption have been effectively constrained through strengthened institutional oversight and enforcement mechanisms. However, corrupt actors have increasingly adopted sophisticated and covert means, such as equity holding on behalf of others, forward interest agreements, and disguised transaction arrangements, to carry out power-for-money deals that evade conventional detection. These new forms of implicit corruption are deliberately concealed beneath the outward appearance of legitimate civil transactions, thereby posing prominent and unprecedented difficulties for criminal judicial identification and legal determination. Current domestic research on this topic encompasses conceptual definitions, doctrinal disputes regarding legal characterization, and proposed governance approaches; yet the existing literature remains fragmented, theoretically inconsistent, and notably lacking in sufficient empirical analysis to substantiate its claims. Meanwhile, relevant overseas research primarily focuses on conflict of interest regulation and commercial anti-bribery frameworks, which, given the distinct institutional and legal contexts, cannot be mechanically transplanted into the domestic anti-corruption paradigm. Based on a systematic review of official policy documents and existing scholarly literature, this paper comprehensively sorts out both domestic and foreign research achievements, carefully distinguishes key academic divergences among scholars, identifies critical research deficiencies and gaps, and clarifies prospective research orientations. The ultimate aim is to provide a solid theoretical foundation and robust scholarly support for the standardized criminal regulation of implicit corruption crimes in the evolving anti-corruption landscape.