Rules-Based Politics in Transition: Power Redistribution and the Changing Authority to Make International Rules

Abstract

This article examines whether contemporary geopolitical tension marks the end of rules-based governance. It challenges the assumption that the post-1945 international order was ever characterized by consistent compliance with rules or by the absence of great-power privilege. Drawing on historical and institutional perspectives in international relations, the article develops three arguments. First, violations of international law do not by themselves demonstrate the disappearance of rules, because rules have long coexisted with military force, hierarchy, and strategic interest. Second, great powers often sustain institutions because institutionalized rules stabilize expectations, reduce the costs of maintaining order, and convert material advantages into more durable strategic influence. Third, the central transformation in contemporary world affairs concerns authority over rule-making and interpretation rather than a simple transition from rules to power. The diffusion of influence toward China, India, and the Global South makes international rules more contested and unevenly enforced, while also intensifying disagreements conducted through the language of legality and legitimacy. The article concludes that rules-based governance persists, but it is entering a more multipolar phase in which the authority to define, interpret, and apply international rules is increasingly dispersed.